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THE UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY
"The inherent and fundamental difference between actions at law
and suits in equity cannot be ignored." So said the New York Court
of Appeals' nearly seventy-five years after the legislature had solemn-
ly ordained that "The distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing,
are abolished; and, there shall be in this state, hereafter, but one form
of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the
redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a
civil action. ' 2
The statement made by the Court of Appeals has been accepted
even beyond its face value by lower New York courts. Not only have
they dismissed complaints brought "in equity" which should have been
brought "at law" where the defendant has appeared but has not
answered,8 but even after answer or after trial they have reversed and
dismissed complaints for the same reason. In Poth v. Washington
Square M. E. Church,' an action was brought for specific performance
of a contract concerning realty. No claim for damages was made. It
appeared that specific performance was not proper and that the plaintiff
was entitled to the return of his deposit money. At the close of the
case he moved to conform the pleadings to the proof on the subject of
damages. The motion was granted and money damages were awarded.
On appeal the Appellate Division reversed, and ordered the complaint
dismissed, with costs to the defendant. The court held that specific per-
formance was properly refused, and continued (p. 224) :
........ Nor could the court award damages here. The suit was
wholly for equitable relief and none was found to be properly award-
able. The return of the deposit money was not asked in the complaint
'See Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 154, 118 N. E. 512.
'N. Y., Laws 1848, c. 379, § 62.
'Chadbourne v. Maver (1924) 207 App. Div. 754, 202 N. Y. Supp. 805;
Robinson v. Whitaker (1903) 205 App. Div. 286, 199 N. Y. Supp. 680. See
(1924) 24 Columbia Law Rev. 286;" (1924) 33 Yale Law Journ. 881.
' (1923) 207 App. Div. 219. 201 N. Y. Supp. 776.
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nor was the question of its forfeiture or counterclaims against it con-
sidered. The pleading of plaintiff did not request its return, and
amending the plea to conform to damages proved in an equity suit
where no damages are demanded is not proper practice."
The court supports this resurrection of old law and equity prac-
tice by a quotation from the Jackson case, cited above, to the effect that
the complaint should be dismissed. It failed, however, to note that the
Court of Appeals in that case actually did not dismiss, but ordered a
new trial.'
In Daly v. Sobieski," the Supreme Court had before it a complaint
seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract to lease for a
period exceeding a year. The defendant filed his answer and then
moved for judgment on the pleadings, urging that since the contract
was shown to be oral, the statute of frauds applied. The court held that
the point need not be considered, because the plaintiff's failure to allege
that he had no adequate remedy at law was fatal in an action in equity.
The motion was therefore granted, with leave, however, to amend.
These cases, while perhaps somewhat extreme, seem rather typical
of the present attitude of the New. York courts towards the funda-
mental principle of the Code reform.7 A great English judge has said :8
"Whether or not it could be recovered at common law ....... it is
not necessary to decide ........ we have to apply the general law, legal
and equitable ..........
So the late Professor Maitland said: "The day will come when
lawyers will cease to inquire whether a given rule be a rule of equity
or a rule of common law: suffice it that it is a well-established rule
administered by the High Court of Justice."'  But in New York, the
birth state of the Code, there seems to be actually less fusion today
than there was seventy-five years ago.
The present course of decision in New York is all the more to be
regretted because the same views were advanced in the early days of the
Code and were at that time rejected by the New York courts in some
able decisions. ' Many of the early judges, of whom perhaps Selden was
the most striking example, bitterly objected to the principles of the
'Jackson v. Strong, supra, footnote 1. The case of Saperstein v. Mechan-
ics & Farmers Say. Bank (1920) 228 N. Y. 257, 126 N. E. 708, cited infra, foot-
note 37, was not cited.
' (1924) 123 Misc. 176, 204 N. Y. Supp. 546.
' Other recent decisions are discussed by Mr. Jay Leo Rothschild, Simplifi-
cation of Civil Practice in New York (1923) 23 Columbia Law Rev. 618, 619;
(1924) 24 Columbia Law Rev. 732, 733-742.
'Collins, Al. R., in Bannatyne v. MacIver [1906] 1 K. B. 103.
'Maitland, Equity (1910) 20; cf. Giles v. Lyon (1851) 4 N. Y. 600 (an
action commenced under the Code cannot be an "equity case").
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Code. Selden especially made the same assertion of the fundamental
difference between law and equity as is now repeated by the court."
Referring to him and some of his associates, Chief Justice Winslow of
Wisconsin said many years later:
"The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code
received from the New York judges is matter of history. They had
been bred under the common law rules of pleading and taught to re-
gard that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with sus-
picion a system which was heralded as so simple that every man would
be able to draw his own pleadings. They proceeded by construction to
import into the Code rules and distinctions from the common law sys-
tem to such an extent that in a few years they had practically so changed
it that it could hardlv be recognized by its creators.""
The learned Chief Justice was then referring especially to the mat-
ter of joinder of parties and of causes. His remarks that. the Code was
substantially nullified by its construction do not apply strictly to the
fusion of law and equity, since there Selden and those who agreed with
him did not prevail. In fact, their views were definitely repudiated by
the Court of Appeals. Thereafter the course of decision was not entirely
uniform, and from time to time there were expressions of the more
illiberal doctrine. 2  But not until recently has there seemed to be a
definite return to it. A little Code history in New York seems apposite.
There can be no possible doubt of the intention of the makers of
the Code to make a "blended" system of law and equity. Their notes
to the provisions of their draft Code, which was substantially that
passed by the legislature in 1848, make this abundantly clear. At some
length they point out the defects of the old system of separate courts
of law and equity, and they then devote some pages to a discussion of
the abolition of the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,
and then some further pages to a discussion of the abolition of forms
of actions at law and suits in equity. They thought they were abolish-
ing not only the forms but the "inherent" distinctions.' 3 Thus Chief
'Reubens v. Joel (1856) 13 N. Y. 488; Voorhis v. Childs' Executor (1858'
17 N. Y. 354.
'See McArthur v. Moffet (1910) 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N. W. 445.
2E. g., Earl, J., in Gould v. Cayuga -Co. 'Nat'l Bank (1881) 86 N. Y. 75;
Bradley v. Aldrich (1869) 40 N. Y. 504. Cf. also the requirement, at variance
with Code principles, that the pleader shall have and maintain a certain theory
of the pleadings. Goulet v. Asseler (1860) 22 N. Y. 225; Barnes v. Quigley
(1874) 59 N. Y.-265; Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (1915) 216 N. Y. 220,
110 N. E. 426. See Whitter, The Theory of a Pleading (1908) 8 Columbia Law
Rev. 523; Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleading in Code States (1922) 10
Cal. Law Rev. 202; Scott, The Progress of Law (1919) 33 Harvard Law Rev.
236, 238. More liberal decisions in New York are referred to hereinafter.
" First Report of Commissioners on Pleading and Practice (N. Y. 1848)
pp. 67-87, 137-147, and elsewhere passim.
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Justice Comstock, when explaining later his failure to object to Judge
Selden's discussion in Reubens v. Joel,"4 of the inherent difference be-
tween law and equity said that he "hesitated in regard to the power of
the legislature under the Constitution to abrogate all the distinctions
between legal and equitable actions. That such was the expressed in-
tention of the legislature in the Code of Procedure I never had any
doubt. Both of these questions must now be considered at rest."1
The case of Reubens v. Joel, in which Selden wrote the opinion-
later said to be a personal expression only'0-was decided in 1856. In
the previous year, when Selden was not on the bench, the court decided
the case of Marquat v. Marquat' said recently in the Columbia Law
Review to represent "the overwhelming weight of authority" in New
York. 8  It held that where the plaintiff asked for equitable relief but
at the trial proved only a case for legal relief, the latter relief should
be granted. The court, through Judge Johnson, said:
"The Code (§ 275) provides that if the defendant has answered,
the court may grant the plaintiffs any relief consistent with the case
made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. In case no
answer has been put in, the relief granted cannot exceed that demanded
in the complaint. In the former case the demand of relief in the com-
plaint becomes immaterial. The case made by the complaint and the
limits of the issue alone determine the extent of the power of the court.
These expressions of the statute include the statement of the right of
the plaintiffs and its infringement by the defendants. These constitute the
case. The addition to these material facts of others, which neither show
a right in the plaintiffs, nor a wrong thereto on the part of the defend-
ants, do not add to or alter the legal case contained in the complaint. They
may render the pleading inartistic, and perhaps subject the party to an
order under § 160 striking out the irrelevant or redundant matter; or,
if by means of them the pleading is so indefinite and uncertain that the
precise nature of the charge is not apparent, to the necessity of amend-
ment, but they do not limit his right to give evidence upon the trial,
nor impose upon the court any restraint as to the nature or extent of
the relief to be given ....... 19
"Supra, footnote 10."See New York Ice Co. v. North Western Insurance Co. (1861) 23 N. Y.
357, 360.nIbid.
a' (1855) 12 N. Y. 336.
"See (1924) 24 Columbia Law Rev. 286, 289.
"At page 341. "The Code (§275)" is now C. P. A. §479. The recent
cases, supra, footnote 3, raise the question whether a demurrer or motion to
dismiss the complaint may be considered an "answer" within the meaning of
this rule, so as to make the prayer for relief immaterial. It seems that the
codifiers had in mind the situation where the defendant made default of ap-
pearance, but the Code was unfortunately worded. The New York cases are
in conflict, some holding a demurrer or motion to dismiss sufficient, while others
require a technical answer. The later Appellate Division cases above cited take
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The dispute in the court finally resulted in the decision in Phillips
v. Gorham2 in 1858, Chief Justice Johnson writing the opinion, Judges
Selden and Pratt dissenting. Here the court held that the constitution
did not prevent the legislature from allowing, as it had done, legal and
equitable grounds of claim to be united in a complaint. The court then
proceeded to discuss the question before it upon the true ground,
namely, fair statement of the cause of action: "If these views are cor-
rect, then the objection is reduced to one of mere variance and within
the settled rules on that subject, created no bar to a recovery. The
ground was clearly understood, no one was surprised or misled, the
parties went to trial prepared to try, and did try, the very question on
which their rights depended. If there was any defect of parties, or if
the defendant was entitled to any restitution, he should have presented
his claim at the trial and it would then have been, as we must presume,
properly disposed of."'1  Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed.
Many other cases fully sustain the same position.22
It is submitted, with all deference to the present Judiciary of New
York, that the theory there set forth is irreproachable. The Code united
law and equity into one system of jurisprudence to be administered in
the one civil action. In fact it is unfortunate to continue to speak of
law and equity, since that naturally tends to preserve old distinctions.
The former principles of equity jurisprudence are now a part of our
one body of applicable legal rules. These rules have no place in the
pleadings, which are to state "facts," i.e., to state past events, to give a
segment of private history between the litigants. The complaint is to
state the facts constituting the cause of action. The demand for relief
is no part of the cause of action and, where "the answer is filed," is to
be disregarded. It is for the court, not the parties, to apply the law to
the case; hence a theory of the pleadings, or a characterization of the
action as legal or equitable or tort or contract should be disregarded.
The only duty on the pleader is to give a fair and sufficient statement
the stricter view. See (1924) 24 Columbia Law Rev. 286; (1924) 33 Yale Law
Journ. 881. In Connecticut, unlike code states, the prayer for relief remains
important throughout, in form at least, since it must be formally amended at the
trial to correspond to the relief given. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) §§ 5672, 5673.
2* (1858) 17 N. Y. 270.
'At page 275.
'See, e. g., New York Ice Co. v. North Western Insurance Co., supra,
footnote 15; Barlow v. Scott (1861) 24 N. Y. 40; Emery v. Pease (1859) 20
N. Y. 62; Lattin v. McCarty (1869) 41 N. Y. 107; Williams v. Slote (1877) 70
N. Y. 601; DiMenna v. Copper & Evans Co. (1917) 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N. E.
993. The case of Hahl v. Sugo (1901) 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 should be
especially noted. An action in ejectment for possession of premises upon
which the defendant has encroached is upon the same cause of action as an
equitable proceeding for an injunction to secure the removal of the encroach-
ment and the two remedies cannot be split. Cf. City of Syracuse v. Hogan
(1923) 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406.
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of facts, and all the court should require of him is this. His law may
be disregarded if he gives fair notice to his opponent and to the court.23
And hence, as the New York court says in Phillips v. Gorham, the
objection from the defendant "is reduced to one of mere variance."
Applying this rule to the three recent cases referred to at the beginning
of this article, it would seem that, disregarding the plaintiff's erroneous
statements of law, in each of them fair notice was given. Certainly,
in any event, an amendment should have been allowed.
It seems to have been thought by some that legal rights denote a
legal cause and equitable rights denote an equitable cause, and that on
claims for both legal and equitable relief there must necessarily be
separate causes of action. Such a view is at variance with the whole
idea of the Code. It makes the relief, which means the plaintiff's
lawyer's idea of the law, the test of the cause of action. Theni a cause
of action, instead of being a statement of facts, of past acts and events,
would be an attempted prophecy of law. The sound view is that a
single cause of action may give rise to various rights of action, "for-
merly denominated" legal or equitable, as the case may be.24
Hence it is submitted that the statement quoted at the beginning of
the article is not true. There are no inherent and fundamental objec-
tions to the giving of legal and equitable relief in a single form of civil
action. It is true as well as obvious that equitable is not the same as
legal relief, that an injunction is not identical with a judgment for
money damages. It is likewise true and obvious that court trials and
jury trials are not identical. But further, it is true that neither the
ultimate remedy to be granted nor the form of fact-finding process used
* These points have been developed more at length in an earlier article
by the writer. See The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 Yale Law Journ. 817.
"See Wright v. Wright (1873) 54 N. Y. 437, 442-443. "While regard is
still to be had in the application of legal or equitable principles, there is not of
necessity any difference in the mere form of procedure, so far as case to be
stated in the complaint is concerned. All that is needful is to state the facts
sufficient to show that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and it is
the duty of the court to afford the relief without stopping to speculate upon the
name to be given the action." Perhaps the prophecy added by the court is in
point at the present time. "Indeed, if some such result has not been attained
by the Code of Procedure, we are still in the labyrinth of legal technicalities in
practice and pleading contrived long ago, and tending to enslave the adminis-
tration of justice, and from which it has been hoped we had, by legislative aid,
secured comparative freedom."
For fuller development, see the writer's article, supra, footnote 23. See also
Einefy v. Pease, supra, footnote 22; New York Ice Co. v. North Western In-
surance Co., supra, footnote 15; Cahoon v. Bank of Utica (1852) 7 N. Y. 486;
Lattin v. McCarty, supra, footnote 22; Crary v. Goodman (1855) 12 N. Y. 266;
Stevens v. Mayor of N. Y. (1881) 84 N. Y. 296; White v. Lyons (1871) 42 Cal.
279; Leonard v. Rogan (1866) 20 Wis. 540; see McMahon v. Plumb (1916) 90
Conn. 281, 285, 96 Atl. 958; Trowbridge v. True (1884) 52 Conn. 190, 197.
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require the preservation and continuation of separate tribunals, of sepa-
rate actions and of separate forms of action.21
The constitutional right of trial by jury is usually the final and ulti-
mate argument of those who feel that old distinctions are inherent in
the nature of things. This constitutional right causes sufficient bother
in trials, is a sufficient hindrance to effective trial work; we ought there-
fore by no means to give it more scope than it actually deserves. It
applies to the form of trial, not to the form of pleading. The consti-
tution requires no special method of pleading and the legislature was
free to choose such method as it pleased.2" It decided upon a system of
stating facts. When the pleadings are closed, and the issues formed,
then comes the question of form of trial. At this point our constitu-
tion says, in effect, that either party has a right to a trial by jury (un-
less it is waived) on issues which were formerly decided by a jury.
Broadly speaking, this includes all "law" cases and no "equity" cases
of the old regime, although this is not the exact line of demarcationY.2
The pleadings settle the issues; the issues settle the form of trial. If
the pleadings do not settle the issues, they should be made clearer. No
serious constitutional difficulty need be had in working out these rules,
and as a matter of fact, none is had in many jurisdictions. In a single
case there may therefore be both jury issues and court issues, though
the court may, if it chooses, send all the issues to the jury. The pro-
cedure is no more complicated than sending a case to a master or
referee. No fundamentals of distinctive forms of action or tribunals
are involved.28
The case first referred to, Jackson v. Strong,29 may well illustrate
See Cook, Equitable Defences (1923) 32 Yale Law Journ. 645; Union of
Law and Equity and Trial by Jury under the Codes (1923) 32 Yale Law Journ.
707, by the present writer.
' As Professor R. W. -Millar's The Formative Principles of .Civil Pro-
cedure (reprinted from 18 Ill. Law Rev. 1, 94, 150) should show, there are many
methods of pleading in vogue in other countries, and there is no inherent
promise of perfection in the methods employed in common law countries.
" Thus by statute certain "equity" cases may be triable by the jury. Rohssler
v. Rohssler (1923) 120 Misc. 569, 199 N. Y. Supp. 830 (partition suit under
C. P. A. § 1023), criticized in Rothschild, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 741. Cf. City of
Syracuse v. Hogan, supra, footnote 22; see (1923) 23 Columbia Law Rev. 590.
And certain "equitable defenses" may have worked over into the law before the
adoption of the Code. Kirk v. Hamilton (1880) 102 U. S. 68; see (1914) 49
L. R. A. (N. S.) 775; Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes (1920)
18 Mich. Law Rev. 717, 721.
" See supra, footnote 25; also cases supra, footnote 24; Roy v. Moore
(1912) 85 Conn. 159, 162, 82 Atd. 233; Back v. People's National Fire Ins. Co.
(1922) 97 Conn. 336, 116 At. 603; Bisnovich v. British American Assurance
Co. (1924) 100 Conn. 240, 123 Atl. 339; Anous v. Craven (1901) 130 Cal. 691.
64 Pac. 1091; Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899) 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515; Leonard
v. Rogan, supra, footnote 24; Sternberger v. McGovern (1874) 56 N. Y. 12, 21. •
"Supra. footnote 1.
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the point. In that case the plaintiff set up a contract which he alleged
created a partnership between himself and the defendant, and asked
for an accounting and recovery of the amount due. The defendant
answered that he had simply agreed to pay the plaintiff the reasonable
value of his services. The case was referred to a referee, who found
in favor of the defendant's version of the agreement, and that the
plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for the value of his services. The
defendant filed exceptions, but the court entered judgment in accord-
ance with the referee's report. On appeal the court said :"G
"We have then a case wherein the complaint sets forth a cause of
action in equity which, as the finding was, the plaintiff failed to prove
on the trial, and the court without any amendment of the pleadings
awarded the plaintiff damages as in an action at law. Was that proper?
I think not. There is some confusion in the cases bearing upon this sub-
ject, but the weight of authority is that where some ground of equit-
able jurisdiction is alleged in a complaint but fails of proof in its entire
scope on the trial, and it appears that there never was any substantial
cause for equitable interference, the court will not retain the action and
grant purely legal relief, but will dismiss the complaint ..........
And the court decided that "the judgment appealed from be re-
versed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event."
The case is not only opposed to the view of previous cases above
referred to, but at least one case seems contra, on almost identical
f acts.3 1 It is submitted that the ground of decision urged,--that of dis-
tinction between law and equity,-clearly is not sound. But we may
look further. Has defendant suffered any harm? It appears clear that
he owes the money and should eventually pay. But he may have been
harmed by being deprived of trial by jury, for it seems there is a jury
"Pages 153-154.
' Williams v. Slote, supra, footnote 22 (accounting asked on breach of
contract; case referred without objection to referee; later the trial court or-
dered the complaint dismissed since it alleged an equitable cause while the proof
showed a legal cause: held, error; the cause of action was the same, it was
legal, the equitable prayer for relief not being conclusive, and the objection
could not be first raised in an appellate court). Accord, New York Ice Co. v.
North Western Insurance Co., supra, footnote 15; White v. Ryan and Leonard
v. Rogan, supra, footnote 24; Barlow v. Scott, supra, footnote 22, where there
was an express holding of waiver. But see contra, Bradley v. Aldrich, supra,
footnote 12, explaining the Barlow case on the ground that the relief prayed for
was in the alternative, specific performance or damages,--an insufficient ground
in view of the fact that the relief was not a part of the complaint. Cf. Ander-
son v. Chilson (1895) 8 S. Dak. 64, 65 N. W. 435. The note cited in Jackson
v. Strong-19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064-deals with the old equity practice, and
points out, page 1075, that the effect of the code, "broadly stated" is "to permit
the retention" of the case. (Italics the writer's).
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issue involved.3 2 " Here, however, the question of waiver arises. Going
to trial without a waiver, and consent to a reference are equally waivers
of jury trial.33 If the defendant at the time of the reference knew of
the jury issue, he has waived his right.
Now it is true that the plaintiff sued on the theory that his remedy
was equitable. But it is not for him to decide, and his characterization
of the case, as we have seen, is of no importance. The real question in
the case is, did he give fair notice in his complaint of the exact contract
on which he was relying? It seems that he did. The defendant knew
the contract and correctly characterized it in his answer. He has waived
his right, and should not now, having speculated on the outcome, be
allowed to upset the just result reached, and obtain another chance. 34
The application of these principles to the other cases may readily
be perceived.
A further point may be noted. If the complaint is not sufficiently
definite the remedy is to order it made more definite, not to dismiss the
complaint. Even in states where.law and equity are not blended, the
complaint in a case wrongly brought in equity is not dismissed but is
transferred to the law side of the court.3 5 This same rule has been
applied in several cases in New York 8 and a decision of the Court of
Appeals subsequent to Jackson v. Strong stated this to be the proper
'= In a criticism of the case in (1918) 32 Harvard Law Rev. 166, it is sug-
gested that since the defendant in his answer admitted the contract and its
breach, there was no jury issue. But there was surely a jury issue on the
amount of the recovery.
"Adams v. Brady (N. Y. 1893) 67 Hun. 521, 22 N. Y. Supp. 466; Baird
v. Mayor (1878) 74 N. Y. 382.
" Phillips v. Gorham, supra, footnote 20; Peckham, J., dissenting in Degraw
v. Elmore (1872) 50 N. Y. 1, 7: "Probably in not one case in ten thousand has
injustice been done from the ignorance of a suitor as to the matters to be tried.
"But the cases of loss and damages to suitors by some defect of pleading
have been innumerable."
Under the Connecticut provisions, supra, footnote 19, when the prayer for
relief is amended in the trial, "reasonable opportunity" to claim a jury trial
must then be afforded the defendant. Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 5673.
" Bimninghamn Sawmill Co. v. Southern Ry. (1923) 210 Ala. 126, 97 So. 78;
McGraw Co. v. Canta Fire & Rubber Co. (Iowa 1922) 190 N'. W. 129; Koontz
v. Houghton (1923) 224 Mich. 463, 194 N. W. 1018; Castley v. Smith (Pa.
1923) 122 Atl. 280; see Federal Equity Rules (1912) 22; (1924) 24 Columbia
Law Rev. 286.
N Sternberger v. McGovern, supra, footnote 28; Margraf v. Miner (1874)
57 N. Y. 155, 159; Haffey v. Lynch (1894) 143 N. Y. 241, 38 N. E. 298; Everett
v. De Fontaine (1903) 78 App. Div. 219, 79 N. Y. Supp. 692; Doctor v. Reiss
(1917) 180 App. Div. 62, 167 N. Y. Supp. 193; Kraemer v. World Wide Trading
Co. (1921) 195 App. Div. 305, 183 N. Y. Supp. 16; see Loeb v. Supreme Lodge,
Royal Arcanum (1910) 198 N. Y. 180, 186, 91 N. E. 547 (where the plaintiff
declined to ask to go to "the law side"); C. P. A. § 111 (that the cause may be"remitted to the proper term or court to be disposed of, in order that the relief
may be finally granted which is appropriate to the facts to the same extent as
if the application had been in the first instant for the relief granted") ; see
Rothschild, op. cit., footnote 7, p. 736.
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procedure. 87 In spite of the ambiguous language in Jackson v. Strong,
relied on by the Appellate Division, it seems that all the court there
contemplated when it ordered a new trial was an amendment of the
complaint, followed by a transfer to the jury calendar. The expression
"motion to transfer to the law side" used in some of the New York
cases 8 is unobjectionable in substance, since it means that, jury trial
not having been waived, the case is to go onto the jury calendar, i.e.,
to be transferred from "Special Term" to "General Term." But the
expression is quite unfortunate in form. It indicates something in-
herent, a different side of the court, rather than merely a pure matter
of convenience in arranging trials so that jury cases may be tried to-
gether.
The union of law and equity is justly considered to be the founda-
tion principle of the Code reform.39  The current resurrection of law
and equity as distinct systems in New York can only be viewed with
dismay by those interested in a simpler pleading which shall emphasize




- Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Sav. Bank, supra, footnote 5, ap-
proved in Holden v. Efficient Craftsman Corp. (1923) 234 N. Y. 437, 138 N. E.85. 8 Loeb v. Supreme Lodge, Royal Arcanum, supra, footnote 36, and other
cases cited, supra, footnotes 36, 37.
' See Pomeroy, Code Remedies (4th ed. 1904) §§ 4, 5; Taylor, The Fusion
of Law and Equity (1917) 66 Univ. of Pa. Law Rev. 17; Taylor, Law Reform
(1917) 11 Ill. Law Rev. 402; Hogg, Law and Equity-the Test of Their Fusion
(1910) 22 Jurid. Rev. 244.
'Apparently the common law forms of action also are being resurrected in
New York,-even the distinctien between general and special assumpsit. In
Henry Glass & Co. v. Misroch (1924) 206 N. Y. Supp. 373, the verdict of the jury
and judgment of the court were for the sale price of goods, whereas, so the
Appellate Division says, they should have been merely for damages for refusal
to accept, title not having passed. The defendant had quite properly asked for a
new trial. The Appellate Division, however, ordered the complaint dismissed.
